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In the wake up ubiquitous agrarian crisis reflected in decelerating growth and increasing farmer 
suicides this paper examines the institutional constraints faced by agricultural sector. This paper 
interprets institutions in the very general sense of rules of structure in agricultural production 
and market interaction. Considering contract farming as a new institutional arrangement 
evolved in Indian agriculture to minimize risk and maximize profit, the paper assesses its 
strength in addressing the above problems. The basic question examined is how can contract 
farming help farmers especially smaller ones in the presence of imperfection of agrarian market 
(input, output, credit, etc)? Insights from theoretical literature and evidence from empirical 
studies show that contract farming would be able to address (at least partially) the market 
imperfections and have significant positive impact on farm households’ income and employment. 
Nonetheless the impact of contract farming is specific to regions, crops and farmer. Due to 
prevalence of weak legal system and weak bargaining power of farmers the contracts are generally 
biased against farmers.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Since last one decade Indian agriculture has been facing numerous problems, 
including those of decelerating productivity, poor growth, increasing numbers of 
farmer suicides, and widening disparities in farm incomes. This is not to say that 
globalisation and market liberalization have not presented a positive impact on 
agriculture in general and high-value crops, livestock production in particular. 
However, to reap the benefits or to act on these advantages there is a need for 
superior institutional as well as technological control over processing and marketing 
of agricultural commodities. But because of problematic agricultural environment 
and limited abilities of the small and medium-sized farmers (who are dominating), 
the agricultural sector is unable to realize its full potential. On the other hand, in 
many Indian states, agricultural land are being converted and used for non-
agricultural purpose which is further reducing the overall agricultural yield. Not 
only that such a phenomenon has serious implication for intergenerational 
livelihood and food security but it also raises questions regarding the 
competitiveness of agricultural sector in the years to come. 
 
Responding to these challenges in agricultural management (production and 
marketing), the Central and the various State Governments of the Indian Union have 
pursued an array of policy measures. Among those measures, promotion of private 
sector participation in agriculture has emerged as interesting alternative. Private 
sector engagement in agriculture is observed in different areas: important ones 
being, promotion of agricultural inputs market and output market, agricultural 
Research and Development (R&D) and in different formats- vertical integration, 
contract farming and also open market participation. This paper gives attention 
towards effectiveness of contract farming in India. The recent literature on 
agricultural management views contract farming as a new institutional arrangement 
encompassing agriculture and industry which could help to reduce the risks and 
uncertainties involved in agriculture. In this context, it is important to revisit the 
Indian agricultural experience to comment upon the potential benefits and 
beneficiaries of the contract farming system. Specifically, our concern is to 
comprehend why do above problems persist in Indian agriculture, how severe are 
they, and what are their causes? Further, it is important to know the extent to which 
weak institutions and imperfect agrarian market are a matter of cause? In this 
regard, the present paper critically reviews the existing literature presents some 
insights on the institutional rigidities inherent in Indian agriculture and tests the 
suitability of contract farming under alternative conditions. The rest of the 
discussion is planned as follows. Section II examines the nature of constraints 
prevailing in Indian agriculture. Section III explores the hypothetical argument 
regarding effectiveness of contract farming. Section IV deals with conclusion and 
some policy implication.  
  
By measuring simply growth rate would not give us the proper answer for this poor 
performance of agricultural sector. To understand and deal with these types of 
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concerns we need to go beyond the simplistic quantitative mindset that pervaded 
economic theory in general and policy making in agriculture in particular. A 
systematic strategy is required, without which agriculture is likely to face continuing 
problems of rising costs and falling productivity. 
 
II. Institutional Constraints in Indian Agriculture 
 
Institution refers to the rules of a society or of an organization that facilitate 
coordination among people by expanding the individual actions. The question arises 
regarding institutions and economic performance. The evidence tells us there is a 
strong link between institutions and economic performance. Financial crisis in South 
Asia, low economic growth in South Africa are examples. North (1990) argues that 
institutions affect performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of 
exchange (transaction costs) and cost of production (transformation costs). So an 
efficient institution plays an important role in development process by mobilizing 
higher investment but an inefficient institution keeps economy at a low level 
equilibrium2. North (1990) and Bardhan (1999) have indicated the evidence relating 
poverty and weak institutions. The institutional structures of such economies do not 
create incentives for economic actors to perform productive activities, leading to 
slow economic development. As in much of institutional economics, we interpret 
institutions in the very general sense of rules and structure of agricultural 
production and market interactions. This paper argues that in the absence of efficient 
institutions the agrarian economy continues to struggle at a very low-level income, 
production and consumption equilibriums. In order to review the performance of 
the underlying agricultural institutions in India and inherent difficulties of the 
agricultural sector, the paper highlights the institutional performance from six broad 
perspectives; namely, agrarian credit institutions, agricultural inputs market, 
agricultural output market, agricultural research and extensions, agricultural 
insurance, and infrastructure provisions.  
     
Credit is crucial in determining the cultivation practices of farm households as it 
forms an important means to purchase inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and 
chemicals as well as durable productivity inputs such as machinery. Because of the 
presence of constraints in self-financed agriculture, small and marginal farmers often 
adopt bias investment strategy towards marginal variations within the traditional 
technology. Parthasarthy and Prasad (1978) found that small and marginal farmers 
were unable to adopt capital goods and HYV technology during the mid sixties and 
seventies because of difficulties and inadequacy of institutional credit. Much of the 
criticism in this regard could be attributed to the fact that India as such had limited 
resources for investment purpose and whatever minimum, that was invested 
appropriated by the big farmers due to cumbersome institutional procedures and 
network. Though there had a significant increased the formal credit in the 1970s in 
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rural areas across states with the establishment of a large network of Rural Financial 
Institutions (RFIs) and a subsequent decline in that in the 1990s and henceforth with 
the gradual shortage of formal credit in situation operations in rural areas. As a 
result there has been increasing the dominance of informal sector for providing 
credit to farmers. For instance, around 58 per cent of the total agricultural loans are 
coming from institutional sources and non-institutional sources like moneylenders, 
traders etc. who charges very high interest rate account for 42 per cent (Bhalla, 2006). 
As a matter of fact it could be argued that most of the small and marginal farmers 
would be coming under the purview of the latter informal credit authorities 
(moneylenders) rather than falling in the domain of institutional loans. This has 
manifested an illusionary impact of rising agricultural credit because what is 
observed for the decade of nineties is a decline in agricultural credit for small and 
marginal farmers but not for large farmers during the same period3. Because of 
inability to satisfy lenders’ (Commercial Bank) collateral requirements small and 
marginal farmers have restricted access to formal credit. Sometimes even when 
collateral does not restrict access to formal credit, transaction costs associated with 
acquiring bank loans is high, does not permit farmers to borrow credit from banks. 
Further, wherever co-operative credit structure exists, its monopolistic nature limits 
the choices to people. This induces farmers especially small and marginal ones to 
borrow from informal credit sources such as pushing them into distress condition.  
 
Successful agricultural development in most developing countries today requires 
increased output per hectare and per worker. This agricultural intensification 
depends on the availability and financing of new, often manufactured inputs such as 
fertilizer and pesticides, new seeds, irrigation systems, mechanical power, and 
supplemental minerals. Access to such inputs is often unavailable and sometimes 
costly. This is worse in case of small farmers particularly those who are living in 
remote regions and upland areas. Or the remoteness and lack of infrastructure 
hinders the distribution of chemicals fertilizer to farmers. It is manifested that 80 per 
cent farmers depend on farm-saved seeds and seed replacement is very low despite 
the fact that there has been an increase in annual growth of certified/ quality seed 
distribution. What ever is available more than 80 per cent of planting/seeding 
materials do not meet the minimum standards of Indian Seed Act, 1968 
(Swaminanthan, 2006). Although organized sector has been dominating the market 
for seed production but it is unable to meet existing market demand and to further 
create marketing opportunities for their product. Apart from the private sector 
limitations, the marketing, production, certification, and availability of quality seeds 
at reasonable prices are not gaining proper attention even among the public 
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institutions. The input market is also plagued with problems, such as poor 
enforcement of the Seed Act, because of a number of seed traders in the market cheat 
the cultivators and reliability of the seed quality sold is questionable (Singh, 2005). 
Because of supply constraints the application of fertilizer declined from 55-65 per 
cent in eighties to 50-55 per cent in late nineties though it increased recently. 
Availability of fertilizer and pesticide at a reasonable price with minimum 
transaction costs could lead to their wider application and, perhaps, contribute 
towards productivity growth in agriculture.  
 
In this context, the effectiveness of agricultural research and extension services has 
to be scrutinised. It is observed that despite consistent evidence of higher rates of 
return to agricultural research there are undue pressures to reduce public funding 
for it. Although India has successfully established a chain of agricultural laboratories 
and advanced agricultural research systems its potential, however, has not been 
fully realised. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), earlier Imperial 
Council of Agricultural Research, along with the state agricultural colleges and 
research units are the key agencies to conduct agricultural research, education and 
transfer of technology for advancement of agriculture and allied activities. A 
problem in this regard, is to observe that, India has only 156 agricultural scientists 
per million of its population, while China has 450, and the US with 4,300 (Kumar, 
2006). To provide a wide range of technology to farmers and proper information 
dissemination, 533 Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVK) have been established all over the 
country. Because of squeeze in the financial assistance to states and to these Kendras 
by the central government led to the virtual breakdown of extension of machinery 
and services. Hence majority of farming communities are practicing traditional 
methods of cultivation since research and scientific advice (i.e. when to be 
cultivated, on what type of soil, when to be use fertilizer, feticides and pest control) 
is not reaching to needy farmers in a timely manner. And sometimes farmers 
depend on the informal information providers like input dealers and progressive 
farmers. In addition to this, in the absence of public regulation of such services, the 
resource-poor and gullible farmers are becoming victims of exploitation by 
unscrupulous traders and moneylenders interested in selling spurious materials 
(Rao, 2003). Increasing dependence on inputs dealers led to higher crop failure 
because wrong messages are passed to farmers. Under this circumstance, farmers do 
not get confidence in extension works and they prefer to choose old varieties and 
traditional methods of cultivation. Farmers with low education fail to respond to the 
opportunities provided by new technology and are thus unable to touch the upper 
bound productivity level4. Further the mater of concern is that about 60 per cent of 
farmers are unable to access any information on modern technology (Bhalla, 2006). 
So farmers become less competitive and more vulnerable in open market economy 
compared to those in other countries.  
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Economists assume that all markets are characterized by full knowledge but in real 
world information is not cost free or no perfect market exists (Davis and North, 
1971). The imperfect markets are more observed in agriculture because of 
uncertainty in production process, especially in the context of developing countries. 
These market deficiencies are more pronounced in rural areas. Further due to 
presence of significant intermediaries in the supply chain results in the weak 
transmission of market signals about quality and price to the farmers. In this process 
the middlemen essentially pool the available surplus from farmers paying little 
attention to quality. So farmer does not fetch the breakeven price.  It is observed that 
there are at least six to seven intermediaries in Indian vegetable markets 
(Chakraborty, 2003), which remains as one of the major lacunae of the agricultural 
marketing system in India. Apart from the problem of intermediaries in supply 
chain in agricultural sector another problem is that there are various institutional 
controls over mobility of agricultural commodities between different states. 
Therefore the agricultural marketing Act needs to be modified so that the 
intermediaries between producer and consumer could be reduced. In this 
circumstance agro-industries could play a major role by procuring agricultural 
commodities directly from the farmers. Though presently agro-industries are 
procuring directly from farmers but it is not helping farmers much due to fuzziness 
of agricultural marketing Act. There is also high tax on processed food in India 
compared to other developing and developed countries. On the contrary, Kahn 
(2007) observed that incentives are always given higher to unhygienic unbranded 
foods compare to hygienically packed processed food. It indicates that there is no 
significant incentive for agro-industries to work with farmers. On the other hand, 
farmers are not adequately rewarded in terms of higher price for their efforts in 
producing quality products either by market or by government. Hence there is little 
incentive for farmers and as well as agro-industries to continue to do so and push 
them into an unknown world. 
 
It was expected that the market for agricultural commodities would expand after the 
WTO agreement. Nonetheless, the outcome becomes reversed because of 
opportunistic behaviour of developed countries. Although agricultural commodities 
in developing countries are much competitive compare to the developed countries 
but developed countries provide high subsidies to the farm sector. As a result there 
is falling of international for agricultural commodities. It is observed after 1996 there 
was a deceleration in export growth and import tended to increase5. The 
institutional regulations governing the trade in agriculture commodities need to be 
thought, to some extent, independently of other goods and services. 
 
In agriculture, generally farmer faces risks and uncertainty in his daily life. Crop 
insurance is a risk management tool to protect farmers from uncertainty of 
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agricultural activities. The Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) was 
implemented for 15 years, from Kharif 1985 to Kharif 1999. As per CCIS it was 
mandatory for loanee farmers to grow covered crops and insured 100 per cent of the 
crop loan. The CCIS only charged premiums of 1-2 per cent, while claims made were 
approximately 9 per cent of the sum insured. Factoring in administrative costs, 
participating farmers as a whole had to pay approximately 15 per cent of the sum 
insured without the subsidy. After completion of CCIS period, National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NAIS) implemented from Rabi 1999-2000. It was mandatory for 
loanee farmers to grow covered crops in implementing states. NAIS followed ‘area 
approach6’ where farmer insured are not guaranteed indemnity for their yield losses. 
This leads to prevalence of adverse selection that when a group of farmers is offered 
crop insurance at the premium, as is often the case in government subsidized crop 
insurance. Another problem of this scheme is that farmers who are outside the 
domain of institutional credit are unable to avail this facility and it is not designed to 
cover all crops and all regions. To cope with the uncertainty prevailed in farm 
activities due to fluctuation in market price of the product Farm Income Insurance 
Scheme (FII) has implemented in Rabi season 2003-04 on pilot basis for two crops 
(rice and wheat). The biasness of insurance schemes towards the specific crops and 
specific regions led to decline the farm participation under this scheme. Further, the 
Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited (AIC) was formed by the 
Government of India launched Varsha Bima in 2005 which covers anticipated 
shortfall in crop yield on account of deficit rainfall. This insurance operates during 
June to September for short duration crops, June to October for medium duration 
crops, and June to November for longer duration crops. These periods are state 
specific. In case of ‘sowing failure’ the insurance is for the period from 15th June to 
15th August. Although there is public sector domination to insured crop, however it 
covered only 10 percent gross cropped area (Sinha, 2004) and due to complex 
definition of these insurance schemes most of farmers are not able to avail these crop 
insurance schemes.    
 
Institutional rigidities and bottlenecks are hallmark of developing country 
agriculture but its impact is also fostered by poor investments in a variety of social 
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overhead capital such as roads or irrigation facilities. It is observed that the profit 
margin significantly gets reduced with presence of inefficient infrastructure facilities 
and improper post harvest management. For example, although there has been 
increased number of cold storages and their capacity is not sufficient for today’s 
requirement. The cold chain in India is woefully inadequate to meet the growing 
production of perishables such as fruits and vegetables, milk, fisheries and poultry for 
domestic and export market (Khan, 2007). Another major problem is the absence of 
transportation facilities and good roadways from procurement field to market or to 
cold storage Rs. 23,000 core worth of fruits and vegetables are lost at the 
procurement and retail levels and constitute 50 per cent value of the current fruits 
and vegetables production (Dev and Rao, 2005). Around 20 per cent of the value of 
food produced each year gets lost because inadequate storage and processing 
capabilities. Also about 20 million tones of food grains are lost at the stage of harvest 
and it is estimated to be equivalent to Australia’s entire production (Khan, 2007).  So 
to make agriculture more profitable there is a need of better infrastructure along 
with better management.  
 
To achieve a sustainable agricultural growth with higher income and make it 
distress free the above problems should be addressed properly. There is need for an 
appropriate institutional arrangement among the different actors involved in this 
sector. This calls for greater value addition at the farm level through various post 
harvest operations. Such operations being scale sensitive need to be undertaken on a 
larger scale for being economically viable. Experiences gained in developed and also 
in many developing countries in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America have 
revealed that contract farming has the potential to address these above problems.   It 
is argued that it can increase the farmer’s income by reducing transaction costs 
through coordinating production vertically. At the same time it can meet the 
consumer’s demand through processing (Warning and Key, 2000; Eaten et al, 2001; 
Narayan and Gulati, 2002). Given such experiences elsewhere, does it imply that 
India should go for contract farming in larger scale or not? But, importantly, does 
the choice rest with the farmers or with the firms, which is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
III. Contract Farming and Indian Agriculture: Review of Evidence  
 
Contracting is an intermediate form of industrial organization, standing between 
spot market markets and vertical integration in degree of authority relationships 
between the grower and user of the crops (Grosh, 1994). In spot markets, growers 
and processors meet at a time and agree on price and delivery immediately. On the 
other extreme is vertical integration, where the growers of the crop and the users of 
the crop are within the same firm. Hence growing of the crop is fully coordinated 
with processing and marketing. Contract farming where growers of the crop and 
users of the crop are different. It is a way of organizing agricultural production 
whereby farmers are obliged to supply their produce to agro-enterprises in 
accordance with conditions specified in written or oral agreement. In the jargon of 
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institutional economics, it refers to “an alternative market, which establishes an 
agreement (formal or informal) between grower(s) and firm(s) (Exporters, 
processors, retail outlets, or shippers, for example) to produce and to supply the 
agricultural commodity under forward contract7”. This contract basically includes 
four things-pre-agreed price, quality, quantity or acreage (maximum and minimum) 
and time. From a developmental intervention point of view, it is a situation in which 
the relationship between the agribusiness firm and the farmers takes the form of an 
expert endowing the apprentice with resources, knowledge and skills.  
 
Contract farming includes a number of options depending upon the nature and 
types of contracting agencies, technologies and nature of crop. Contract farming can 
be of different formats such as contract based on market-specification, based on 
resource provision, and based on production management, which are not to be 
mutually exclusive (Minot, 1986). Market specification contracts are pre-harvest 
agreements where firms and growers are attached to a particular set of conditions as 
to what to be produced (product and quality attributes) and what are the 
commitments for future sale (timing, location, and price). Resource providing 
contracts follow conditions of the market specification contracts and add provision 
of the farming inputs namely, seeds, fertilizer and credit. Production management 
contracts bind the growers to follow a particular production method or inputs 
regiment provided by processor, usually in exchange for a marketing agreement or 
resource provision. The first type is generally termed as marketing contracts; the 
other two are known as production contract. The relevance and importance of each 
type varies from product to product and over time (Key and Rusten, 1999).   
 
The effect of contract farming on agricultural development invokes much 
controversy. There are two schools of thought in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
such as Harvard Business Schools of thought and Food First of thought8. The former 
who stresses that agriculture is an international system and believes that small 
farmers can gain from becoming involved in it, and sees agribusiness as a means of 
developing rural areas in LDCs. The latter one comes to opposite conclusion who 
argues the internationalization of agriculture hurts small farmers by exposing them 
out of nutritious traditional food crops and exploit farmers by agribusiness firms in 
the form of control over the land, labor and other local resources. Both schools of 
thought make valid point. We accept these two opposite opinion. We discuss 
contract farming from new-institutional economics perspective by drawing the 
literature from earlier studies. As noted by Grosh (1994) and Key and Rusten (1999), 
at a macro-economic level contracting could help to remove (at least partially) 
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market imperfections in capital (credit), input, labour, product, and share risks. But 
we need to explore how contracting overcomes several market failures common in 
Indian agriculture. Our purpose is not to seek explanations why contracting has 
been used. Rather, we seek to determine whether contract farming permits efficiency 
gains which can be used to increase income available to the rural population.    
 
Imperfect Capital (Credit) Market 
 
We discussed before farmers especially small farmers’ face three types of problems 
to access credit because of high information costs and resource constraints9. First, 
farmers have lack of information regarding the availability of credit. Second, if 
farmers have information regarding the availability of credit because of resources 
constraints they are being outside the credit. Third, if they access credit, sometimes it 
becomes difficult to repay the borrowed amount because of uncertainty in 
agricultural activities. This creates uncertainty in farmer to access credit from 
particular source in next season as well as from other sources because of he loses 
credit-worthiness. The failure of capital markets clearly inhibit the adoption of new 
crops, which often requires investments in new seeds, fertilizes, land improvement 
and irrigation. Under this circumstance contracting can be viewed as a form market 
inter-linkages overcoming capital market failure (Bardhan, 1980; Bauman, 2000). 
Contract crop can serve as collateral, even in the absence of title deeds to land 
appropriately of land. Contract farming serves this function only if the processing 
firm can be sure that it will receive the crop from the farmer.  
 
There is empirical evidence to suggest that for determining whether contract 
farming can be use to replace the non-existence of credit markets. In Tamil Nadu, for 
example, Appachi Cotton Company (ACC) provides crop loan at 12 per cent rate of 
interest to it’s grower (Singh, 2005), which is difficult for such farmers. At the same 
time, there is no restriction for farmers to sell crops to only that particular firm. They 
are free to sell elsewhere if they find prices higher than contract price. Because of 
agro-industries is better positioned in access of credit from organized financial 
market at lower rate of interest. So it becomes easier for farmers to access credit at 
low transaction or no transaction costs. Sometimes, if the firm itself does not provide 
loans to its grower, banks provide credit by accepting ‘contract’ as collateral. For 
examples, basmati rice cultivation under Rallis India in Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharastra, Karnataka and Haryana. The company has tied up with banks like 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) and State Bank of 
India (SBI) for providing credit. In this arrangement, the growers in Panipat availed 
of a loan up to Rs. 6500 per acre for basmati rice cultivation for six-month period at a 
13 per cent rate of interest (Singh, 2005). Suguna Poultry Farm Ltd (SPFL) also binds 
agreement with SBI to finance poultry growers and Maize Growers in Tamil Nadu10.  
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Under this situation the risk of default by farmers is very less because of firms very 
often monitor the production strategy so the chance of crop failures become less, the 
grower could repay their debit. On the other hand firms can assure his return from 
credit given to farmers by inducing the farmers to sell their crop to firm only. 
Generally firms promote farmers to grow high value crop, which has limited 
alternative market, for example, gherkin cultivation in Andhra Pradesh. This would 
be serious implication on farm household’s nutrition level. Defaulting on a loan 
from a firm means that not only will the delinquent borrower sacrifice future credit, 
he will also likely sacrifice future business with the firm (key and Rusten, 1999). 
Therefore it makes obligatory to farmers not to violate the contract with 
company/firms. But because of unequal bargaining power in contract system in 
long run firms try to exploit farmer by increasing his monopsonic power. There is 
also apprehension is about the possibility of the farmers getting locked into a 
situation of deteriorating debt (Little and Watts, 1994). A grower can not move out 
from it after enter into contract even if the expected benefits do not materialize due 
to low price or crop rejection or crop failure. These problems have not addressed in 
India properly.  
 
Imperfection of Labour Market  
 
The human resources of a household can be utilized by employing in own land if 
household has or by selling in the labour market. But because of imperfection in 
rural factor markets, uncertain agricultural environment and social stigma human 
resources are being under utilized.  As a result part of the economically active 
population remains un-employed. Households with large endowments of family 
labour attempt to compensate missing labour market by leasing in more land, or by 
growing more labour intensive crops (Bell, 1989) when family labour is non-
tradable. For growing labour intensive crops there is need for financial help to buy 
modern inputs. Nevertheless, because of imperfection in land market and credit 
markets do not permit households to do it11. On the other hand firms face problems 
like labour shirking and supervision problem when they follow vertical integration 
strategy. For some crops, the performing the labour makes many decisions, and 
monitoring these decisions is very expensive for firm. It is more difficult and costly 
in case of labour intensive crops because it requires more labour supervision. For 
example harvesting gherkin requires the farmers to judge each day which crop is 
ready for harvest, with repeated passes through the same field as the crop matures.   
 
Contract farming overcomes above these problems by generating more employment 
in economy and transferring the production risks from firms to farmers. In contract 
farming, farmer cultivates the firm’s crop under its supervision and supplies to firm 
only under pre-agreed quality. As a result firm easily monitor the labour supervision 
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at low or without any costs. This is common phenomenon, which has observed in all 
contracting schemes in India.  
 
Generally, two types of employment created in contract farming system, 
employment associated with non-farming activities and employment associated 
with farm activities. Non-farming employment includes the job generated in off-
farm activities and in on-farm activities (Little, 1994). A number of jobs are created 
by the ventures in their staff and management structures could be seen as off-farm 
employment generated under contract farming. On-farm employment comprises 
indirect employment generated among the various service providers and supporting 
services to the activities such as cleaning, grading etc which needs more unskilled 
labour. But, the employment created in off-farm activities has not studied in India 
properly or not at all.  Employment created in farming activities includes unskilled 
labour generated in cultivation process during planting to harvesting period. 
Because of labour intensive and perishable in nature of crop under contract farming, 
it generates more employment than the non-contract crop (Key and Rusten, 1999). 
Singh (2002) observed that employment created under contract farming crop such as 
tomato is five times higher than non-contract crop such as paddy12. He also observed 
that contracting has led to more and better employment opportunities for women, 
which accounted for almost 60 per cent of the total labour hours in case of tomato 
cultivation. But because of weak bargaining power among them, they are being paid 
very less compare to their effort (Singh, 2003). Gherkin cultivation in Andhra 
Pradesh (Dev and Rao, 2005) also observed this crop increased employment 
opportunities to family labour as well as other labours and also wages. The question 
here is regarding realization of employment under this system if processor would 
mechanize these highly labour intensive crops. Another question arises regarding 
quality of employment generated in this system.    
 
Coordination Failure in Inputs Market 
 
Seeds, Fertilizer and Pesticide  
We discussed before the inputs market in India is not functioning properly because 
of prevailing of weak market structure along with inadequate infrastructure. As a 
result, vicious circle develops whereby low demand for inputs provides no incentive 
for the development of commercial distribution networks and this, in turn, further 
adversely affects input availability and use. This affects the production and 
productivity of agriculture. So there is need for an alternative institutional 
arrangement to enhance availability such inputs to all regions as well as all sections 
of farmers. Contract farming overcomes these problems through bulk ordering and 
by management (Eaton and Shepred, 2001). In this arrangement farmers have direct 
link with inputs provider. It becomes easier to access such inputs without any 
transaction costs. The main objective of firm to enter into contract agreement is to 
                                                 
12
 It has observed that labour intensity was 640 h per hectare for potato, and 3,600-4,000 h per hectare for 
tomato, as against 740 h per hectare for paddy (Singh, 2002 pp 1632).   
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access steady supply of certain quality and quantity of commodities. This may not 
available in spot/open market. So firm supplies basic inputs such as advanced 
seeds, fertilizer and as well as machinery at free of costs to growers.  
 
There is a lot of empirical evidence regarding inputs supplied firms. Singh (2002) 
and Kumar (2006) found that both local firms and MNCs are supplying inputs such 
as seedlings on credit (with part payment in advances) and various equipments, free 
of costs on returnable basis. In Andhra Pradesh (Dev and Rao, 2005) observed that it 
becomes easier for gherkin growers to access drip irrigation facilities and other 
inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticide. In case of hybrid seed cultivation in 
Haryana the processors are also providing parent seeds (Kumar and Chand, 2004; 
Kumar et al, 2007) to their respective growers. The poultry farming in Andhra 
Pradesh, (Ramswami et al, 2005) also observed that the growers are supplied by the 
chicks along with medicine and other inputs. Recently, many firms made joint 
venture with different facilitators such as seeds, fertilizer companies or dealer and 
banks. If firms could not provide specified inputs to farmers, it asks inputs 
companies to provide such inputs and send detailed accounts to the bank, which 
debits farmer accounts and credits inputs companies. This model of contract farming 
system can be noted as “Quad-Partite Contract Farming Models” (for details see 
Singh, 2005). Rallis India and Hindustan Level Ltd. (HLL) adopted this approach. 
But the impact of this arrangement has not studied.  
 
The question arises about the distribution of these inputs among all sections of 
farmers and all regions. This may be differing from farmers to farmer and from 
regions to region because of heterogeneity in nature. The argument here is that firm 
may provide only progressive farmers and large farmers who have more bargaining 
and political power compare to others. This has not address properly in India. Once 
the production has begun, firm could use his monopoly power over the provision of 
specialized inputs as these factor markets are missing. By rationing these inputs, 
firms restrict the supply of inputs lower than required quantity and quality. This is 
happening in Punjab where the quality of fertilizers and pesticides provided by 
firms are bad and sometimes the quantity supplied by firms also is not meeting 
required quantity for cultivation. Singh (2002) claims that 12.5 per cent of Hindustan 
Lever Ltd. (HLL) farmers, 6.7 per cent of the Nijjer growers and about 15.5 per cent 
of the Pepsi potato growers reported crop failure due to bad seed. The pesticides 
recommended by firms are very costly and non-viable. The farmers also find there is 
some corrupt arrangement between the firm and the pesticide dealers about the sale 
of particular pesticides and insecticide brands. But this study has not discussed who 
are the farmers facing these particular problems and whether specific class or cast or 




Although there is a dominance of public sector for supplying extension service to 
farmers but most farmers are not able accesses the modern techniques of production. 
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Further information on market and the husbandry techniques that would most 
profitably satisfy market demand has not flowed freely. Because of possible risks 
and cost involved, sometimes farmers don’t adopt these techniques if it is available. 
They are more likely to accept new practices when they can rely on external 
resources for material and technological inputs and also assurance of new practices 
(Eaton and Shepred, 2001). Contract farming, however, has proved to be an effective 
conduit for supplying these techniques. Since firms have direct interest for 
improving the quality of product to meet the consumer’s demand, it usually offers 
improved technology and better technical assistance more conscientiously than a 
government agricultural extension services (Minto, 1986). They have an incentive to 
learn from farmers’ experience and modify their advice accordingly. Farmers could 
get good advice without any costs as the farmers use the company staff13.  
 
It is observed that most contracting schemes in India supply extension services to 
farmers and involved much higher ratios of extension agents to farmers than are 
typically find outside contract schemes. The gherkin growers in Karnataka reported 
that the inputs supply by the processor helped to ease working capital requirement 
of the farmers and extension services by the processors was an additional benefit of 
contract farming (Singh and Asokan, 2005). Poultry farming in Andhra Pradesh 
(Ramswami et al, 2005) observed that contract growers are able to standardize the 
production practices where non-contract farmers are not able to do this. 
Unfortunately, these studies did not discuss the earlier knowledge of farmers but 
they assume that learning is a part of the contracting relationship. Contract farming 
has spillover effects in terms of enhanced the productivity of non-contract crops. 
There are few studies, which has discussed spill over effect of contract farming 
system. Most studies observed that the crop productivity of is higher in case of 
contract crop compare to non-contract crop (Kumar, 2006; Tripathi et al, 2005; 
Kumar, 2006) and also non-contract farmer. Dev and Rao (2005) found that gherkin 
and oil palm growers are able to increase the productivity of non-contract crop. 
Nonetheless, this study did not discuss regarding productivity of non-contract 
farmers.  
 
The question arises here regarding technology spillover effect. It is observed that 
farmers who participate in contract farming are heterogeneous and multitude of 
small growers. Firm may not have the managerial capacity to provide them all 
individual attention. The farmers who have advanced knowledge could learn faster 
than others. The standardization process followed by firms may have impact on 
farm’s soil, topography and climate.  Further, if farmer follows the firm’s advice 
                                                 
13
 The South Nyanza Sugar Company (SONY) in Kenya places strong emphasis on field extension services 
to its 1800 contracted farmers, at a ratio of one field officer to 65 sugar-cane growers. The extension staff’s 
prime responsibilities are focused on the managerial skills required when new techniques are introduced to 
SONY’s farmers. These include transplanting, spacing, fertilizer application, cultivation and harvesting 
practices. Also, SONY promotes farmer-training programs and organizes field days to demonstrate the 
latest sugarcane production methods to farmers (Eaton and Shepred, 2001).  
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fully then farmer may lose his traditional skills. Farmers may have abandoned 
traditional cultivation methods, which will be disrupted by the innovations 
introduced in a contractual relationship. The patterns that emerged from the optimal 
utilization of locally available resources might be irreversibly lost, as farmers 
become used to different technologies. It will be difficult to re-establish the 
traditional knowledge of cultivation if in case the farmer exits or the project stopped.  
 
Imperfect of Product Market  
 
When buyers or sellers cannot be sure about quality of the produce except at 
prohibitive cost, the market will not function efficiently, possibly not at all (Akerlof, 
1970). Assume buyers (firms) and sellers (farmers) are both perfectly informed about 
the quality and quantity of goods being sold in the market then it becomes easier for 
both parties to perform their activities efficiently. If the information about quality 
and quantity is costly to obtain, then it is no longer plausible that buyers and sellers 
have the same information about goods involved in transactions. Under this 
circumstance the process of transaction would undermine the processes of exchange 
and localized markets with little rural-urban linkages emerge. Because of high 
information costs, a negative correlation could be generating between household’s 
supply and effective prices at a particular time. A decrease in the market price of a 
commodity can be expected if all households successfully produce that commodity, 
whereas the opposite would occur if households cease to produce it. This creates 
higher variability in production and price. In this environment, farmers produce 
only a limited range of goods and services for their own consumption, which is not 
supplied by market. It could reduce the total production.  
 
Contracting may solve these problems (at least partially) by overcoming the moral 
hazard problems. It integrates primary supplier (farmers) with primary buyers 
(firms). It provides market guarantees to the farmers and assured supply to the 
purchasers. The empirical evidences suggest the same outcome. Evidences include; 
Singh (2002), Kumar (2006), Dev and Rao (2005), Tripathi et al (2005), Ramswami et 
al, (2005), Dileep et al, (2002) and Kumar et al, (2007). These studies found that the 
firms are able to increase probability of achieving proper quality and quantity of 
product and on the other hand it also increased the probability of getting certain 
quantity of produce. Because of assure market outlet for producer’s commodity 
create incentives to increase production. It allows farmers to reduce the transaction 
costs of selling perishable product in uncertain or thin market by organizing 
transport for their crops, normally from the farm gate (Eaton and Shepred, 2001). In 
Andhra Pradesh, Dev and Rao (2005) found firm collects commodity from farm each 
village. In each village firm set up one collection centre and farmer brings 
commodity to collection centre at his risks.  In Punjab Singh (2002), Dillip et al, 
(2002) and Kumar (2006) found farmers bring their commodities to factory at their 
own cost, which takes into account by the firms while fixing the contract price for 
particular region. But sometimes transportation cost is very high for contract rather 
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than non-contract farmer which is observed by Dillip et al, (2002). The differences in 
transportation costs depend on nature of product.   
 
Contracting is most commonly practiced by food processing firms. Since their 
processing plants have high fixed costs, these firms have an interest in keeping raw 
materials inflows at a steady level close to plant capacity. The firms try to keep 
contracting with farmer for long run. This could help stabilize the product market. 
To reap benefits firms invest in export oriented crop or high value crop and 
internalize market to avoid the competition. Gherkin and cocoa cultivation in 
Andhra Pradesh and basmati rice cultivation in Punjab are classic examples. The 
apprehension is that it could create enormous problem in traditional food market. 
Total food production will be decline because of shifting form traditional crops to 
export oriented crops. This could lead to increase the food prices. In this 
environment the non-farm households will suffer who previously subsist. 
  
Generally contract is made between one weak party (farmer) and other strong party 
(firm). The weaker party accepts the ‘unfair’ contract because it has no other option. 
In this circumstance farmer lose his bargaining power. Further, contracting firm 
increases the farmer’s reliance on firm by providing some social services such as 
provision of free transportation rides and distribution of promotional gifts (t-shirt, 
caps, pencils, etc). The reliance on the firm also weakens the farmer’s bargaining 
power. Thus it strengthens the firm’s ability to exercise monopsonistic power on 
farmers. This monopsonistic power could be observed by looking the performance 
of contract agreement. For example, sometimes firms break the promise on 
contractual terms if market circumstances changes because of changing in 
government policy or if other problems arise. Since the price of contract product 
setup based on expectations about future market behaviour, substantial variations in 
the realization of the expectations lead firms to force renegotiation or to engage in 
contractual hold-up. A disguised form of hold-up is the rejection of products 
delivered, under pretext of non-conformity to quality regulations-firms might refuse 
to receive products as a strategy for transferring the financial losses arising from 
unexpected market turns to farmers (Silva, 2005). In this process producers are 
disadvantaged in situation, in terms of both the legal and tacit arrangements. These 
problems have observed in Indian, for example, tomato cultivation in Punjab (Singh, 
2002; Dileep et al, 2002; Kumar, 2006), and Sugarcane cultivation in Orissa (Braja, 
2005).  Singh (2002) found that farmers have to wait at the factory gate for a day or 
more. This led to weight loss due to evaporation and the company would then 
receive a more concentrated product for the same price. Longer delays resulted in 
spoilages and a higher rejection rate. Braja (2005) also observed similar results for 
sugarcane where in actual procurement takes place after 5 to 10 days after the 
harvest. This resulted in weight loss for the farmers but higher sugar realization for 
the factory. However, this type of problem has not observed in case of cottons seed 
(Kumar et al, 2007), wheat seed (Kumar et al, 2004) and Tomato (Tripathi et al, 2005) 
cultivation in Haryana. Bringing suitable legislative measure by government can 
weaken this monopsonistic power of buyer. 
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Imperfection in Insurance Market:  
 
An economic agent can adopt different methods to smooth uncertain socks in future 
consumption. These different methods could be self-insured method and insured by 
other economy agent by entering into a contract. Using one’s wealth to smooth 
uncertain shocks in income and future consumption is called self-insured 
mechanism. Self-insured can work through several channels. Stocks of cash or 
accumulated saving in banks can be run down (or added to) for the purpose. It 
becomes difficult for small farmers because they earn very little income form 
agriculture, however. The same can be done with grain stocks, although holding 
such stocks is costly because grain is not perfectly durable. Farm households to 
smooth the future consumption can adopt institutional methods of coping with risk; 
however, these are not available and are often costly. Further, sometimes households 
also find difficult to get non-institutional methods for sooth future consumption 
because of social stigma. Hence farmers are induced to sale their productive assets 
such as bullock, land and other agricultural instruments at lower market price. This 
affects negatively on productivity efficiency and the average output. Because of 
market imperfection and weak extension service farmers choose lower variability 
income strategies and traditional techniques of cultivation. This could also affect on 
productivity efficiency of farm households.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that like most economic agents, farmers are averse to 
risk and are willing to pay a premium for a reduction in the risk of their income 
(Binswanger, 1980). Under these circumstances farmers are ready to accept lower 
market price to access the stable future income. On the other hand, firms are also 
ready to provide a stable price to avoid market fluctuation. This is possible in 
contract farming, where firms are often in a position to insure growers against 
income fluctuations as well as growers are often insure firms’ against market 
uncertainty. Firms also insure producers against yield risk by providing fixed 
amount of cash to farmers that forgive debt in case of crop failure.  Hybrid rice seed 
cultivation in Andhra Pradesh and maize seed cultivation in Tamil Nadu, for 
example.  In case of maize cultivation in Tamil Nadu the Mahindra Subhlabh 
Services Limited (MSSL) offers the extension service to farmers for a fee and ensures 
a certain level of yield. If farmers get lower than the assured level of yield, then they 
need not pay the fee of extension service. The farmers are paying Rs. 500 per acre, 
achieved assured 75 per cent of the cases in the first year, which increased to 80 per 
cent in the second year, despite drought condition. In Andhra Pradesh the firms pay 
Rs. 18000 per acre if the farmer won’t get minimum yield (six quintal) because of 
natural calamities. Thus, opportunities for reducing smallholder’s risk through 
contracting include diversification into new crops. In addition, most studies have 
emphasized risk reduction as a principal incentive for producers to enter into 
contracts (Kumar, 2006; Singh, 2002). Ramswami et al, (2005) in their study on 
poultry farming in Andhra Pradesh observed that contracting shifts a large 
proportion of market risk from the growers to the processor. This would stabilize the 
farmers’ income.  
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Contract farming gives higher prices to farmers through a buyer who is certain that 
the farmer will deliver the commodity to him. The uncertainty about sales prices is 
often reduced, since contract typically specify at the beginning of the growing cycle 
the prices to be paid at product delivery. Most empirical studies observed that 
contracting scheme able to reduce the price uncertainty of contract crop along with 
yield variability (Singh, 2002; Dileep et al, 2002; Dev and Rao, 2005; Kumar, 2006; 
Ramswami et al, 2005). Dileep et al, (2002) found that, it considerably reduced the 
yield uncertainty and completely removed the price uncertainty among its farmers, 
whereas it becomes very difficult in case of non-contract farmers. Nonetheless 
sometimes contract price becomes lower than market price, which has observed in 
tomato cultivation in Punjab (Dileep et al, 2002). In such situation farmer fails to 
obtain expected benefit. Use of fixed pricing sometimes increases processors risks 
and impedes schemes viability in another way- by reducing farmers’ incentives to 
comply with their contracts. If spot prices rise above the contract price, farmer will 
attempt to renege on their contracts, it may lead to collapse the schemes. Singh 
(2002) observed that when the gap between contract price and market price is very 
large (3-5 times) the farmers are selling the product in outside. The contract farming 
system reduces moral hazard problem and enables be the firm to enforce insurance 
contract by monitoring the farm activities. This has been discussed earlier in credit 
enforcement mechanism. 
 
Although contract farming is an alternative instrument for reducing price and yield 
risk, however, sometimes firms cheat farmer by avoiding transparency in the price 
determination mechanism of the contract and utilizing the complex formula for 
quantity and quality measurements of commodities. In addition, long-term contracts 
might lead to gradually decreasing real prices received by farmers, because of 
monopsonistic behavior of company, which force to farmer accept lower price.    
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 
The above discussion reveals that because of poor performances of institutions 
agriculture is facing major crisis such as, decelerating growth, increasing numbers of 
farmer suicides, and widening disparities in farm incomes. Suicide is confined to 
certain regions and certain group of farmers who produce for market. To overcome 
of these problems successive central and various state governments have been 
undertaking an array of policy measures. Among those measures, promotion of 
private sector participation in agriculture through contract farming is an important 
one. In response to this contract farming has emerged as new institutional 
arrangement encompassing agriculture and industry to bring down the market 
uncertainties.  
 
Credit market failures may induce farmer to enter into a credit contract. However, 
this credit contract does not supply detailed specification of farming practices and 
supply the assured market outlet to farmers. Problems of complex information, 
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which cannot be adequately conveyed by a spot market, will lead to detailed and 
instructive specifications of farming activities. On the other hand spot market cannot 
fulfill the firm’s demand. By entering into contract, farmers can access the better 
quality of inputs such as seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and extension services along 
with credit from sponsor. And contracting company can reduce the risks of non-
availability of quality and quantity raw materials. Contract farming stimulates 
technology and skill transfer, and supports to farmers in meeting of international 
sanitary, phytosanitary, and hygiene requirements.  
 
Contract farming boosts farm income by opening up opportunities and employing 
resources in efficient manner, nonetheless, it creates numerous problems for contract 
farmers and for local economy. It is possible that the farmers can lock into a situation 
of increasing debt because they cannot move out from contract easily after entering 
into it even if the expected benefits do not materialize because of low price or crop 
rejection or crop failure. Usually, firm supplies inputs (sometimes machinery) to 
growers in advance and takes it back payment through the deduction from crop 
income.  This induces farmers to keep contracting with the firm year after year just 
to pay off these loans. The development of these phenomenons are often generate 
problem for farmers who have limited business experience. This is an important 
issue in the Indian context wherein most small farmers do not have knowledge 
about market and they are not market oriented. This has to analyses in proper way.  
 
To access undisrupted supply of raw materials firm provides basic inputs, better 
technology. However, sometimes firm provides bad and often costly seeds, fertilizer 
and pesticides and poor extension services, and also. This inputs are also observed is 
non-viable. This indirect effect is very difficult to observe. These problems should 
study properly. Contracting has certain harmful social consequences, as well. It 
creates tension among the contract and non-contract farmer as well among contract 
family members. Generally firms don’t prefer to work with small farmers. The 
question is here regarding factors influences for participating in contract farming or 
factor induces firms to do contracting with particular section of farmers. Further, an 
issue given little or no attention in India is what happens to those farmers who do 
not get contracts. To regulate the company’s activities the state can pursue some 
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